Central Bank Reform: Official Announcement and Warnings About Its Scope

The national government confirmed that it is working on a bill to reform the Charter of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic (BCRA). The information was released by the Presidency of the Nation after a Cabinet meeting led by President Javier Milei at Casa Rosada, following the events for Independence Day.

According to the official statement, the draft is being prepared and its formal announcement is scheduled for the coming weeks. Once completed, it will be sent to Congress for consideration. In parallel, an opinion column published in La Nación argues that the independence of the Central Bank cannot be achieved solely through technical changes if the Executive retains tools that allow it to capture the institution.

Official announcement and timelines

The Cabinet meeting was held on July 9, after the Te Deum for Independence Day. Participants included Chief of Staff Diego Santilli; Chancellor Pablo Quirno; Defense Minister Carlos Presti; Legal and Technical Secretary María Ibarzabal; Security Minister Alejandra Monteoliva; Deregulation Minister Federico Sturzenegger; Senate Majority Leader Patricia Bullrich; BCRA President Santiago Bausili; presidential advisor Santiago Caputo; Justice Minister Juan Bautista Mahiques; presidential spokesperson Adrián Ravier; Health Minister Mario Lugones; Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Martín Menem; Communications and Press Secretary Fabián Fernández; General Secretary of the Presidency Karina Milei; and Provisional President of the Senate Bartolomé Abdala.

The official statement indicates that President Milei provided details about the project and that the government is working on finalizing the text. No specifics were given regarding the reform’s focus or the draft’s content.

Warnings from La Nación

The La Nación column, titled “The Need for an Independent Central Bank,” argues that BCRA independence is a central issue for the country’s future, but questions whether a government that resorts to practices that weakened institutions can strengthen them. The text asserts that legally shielding the Central Bank is not enough if tools such as decrees of necessity and urgency (DNU) remain, which allow the Executive to concentrate power.

The column notes that Argentina’s chronic inflation is largely explained by the use of the BCRA to finance the fiscal deficit. Therefore, legally limiting that possibility is a reasonable goal. However, it warns that the reform must include specific mechanisms: appointment of authorities with Congressional participation, staggered terms, suitability requirements, expiration deadlines for “acting” positions, partial renewal, an accountability regime, and coordination with the Executive and Congress.

It also mentions that the 1853 Constitution reserved for Congress the power to create and regulate an issuing bank, and the 1994 reform assigned it the responsibility to protect the value of the currency. For La Nación, BCRA independence should not imply democratic isolation, but rather an institutional link with Congress that provides legitimacy.

Historical and legal context

The La Nación column recalls that the 1853 Constitution reserved for Congress the power to create and regulate a bank with the ability to issue currency. The 1994 reform also assigned it the responsibility to protect the value of that currency. According to the column, Law 26.122, enacted in 2006, ultimately allowed DNUs to remain in effect if Congress does not reject them, turning inaction into a form of tacit approval. The text argues that Congress formally retains many powers that, in practice, are increasingly exercised by the Executive Branch.

Comparison of positions

Document: Presidency statement (primary source) and La Nación column (secondary source). Organization and date: Presidency, July 9, 2026; La Nación, August 19, 2026. Unit: Qualitative comparison. Values used: Content of the statement and the column. Operation: Contrasting positions.

Next steps

The central point to follow is the official announcement of the draft reform of the BCRA Charter, expected in the coming weeks. At that time, it will be known whether the project includes the mechanisms that La Nación considers essential: appointments with Congressional participation, staggered terms, deadlines for “acting” positions, and an accountability regime. It will also be relevant to observe whether the government promotes changes to the DNU law, since, according to the column, without that correction, the Central Bank’s independence could remain merely formal.